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British Resistance to European
Integration: An Historical and Legal
Analysis with an Examination of the
United Kingdom's Recent Entry into
the European Monetary System
Political Unity (in Europe), right or wrong, is incompatible with
national independence; and the will to bring Britain into the
Community is the will to give that national independence up. On
this each one of us must take his own resolve. I can say only
what is mine. I do not believe that this nation, which has main-
tained and defended its independence for a thousand years, will
now submit to see it merged or lost; nor did I become a member
of our sovereign Parliament in order to consent to that s6ver-
eignty being abated or transferred. Come what may, I cannot
and I will not.
-Enoch Powell, Member of Parliament, 1971.1
(A)s the enlargement of the Community makes clear beyond
doubt, we have all come to recognize our common European
heritage, our mutual interests and our European destiny. Brit-
ain, with her Commonwealth links, has also much to contribute
to the universal nature of Europe's responsibilities.
-Prime Minister Edward Heath, 1972.'
I. Introduction
As the artificial cold war era alliances of Eastern Europe splin-
ter in favor of ethnic and regional self-determination, the nations of
Western Europe continue to strive toward greater unity. The Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) is an "outgrowth of the Euro-
pean movement, a complex composite of political, social, and eco-
nomic forces which have come to the fore in strength since World
War II." In response to centuries of devastating conflict and tumul-
1. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1971, at 8, col. 1.
2. This is a excerpt from Heath's speech made after the signing of the Treaty of Acces-
sion to the Community on January 22, 1972. F. NICHOLSON & R. EAST, FROM THE SIx TO THE
TWELVE 296-297 (1987) [hereinafter EAST].
3. E. STEIN, P. HAY, AND M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITU-
TIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 1 (3d. ed. 1976) [hereinafter STEIN]. The European Economic Commu-
nity is now commonly referred to as the European Community, the Community, or simply the
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tuous political upheaval, the EEC Treaty" created a consensual or-
ganization of European nations in which "unity is to be achieved not
by might but by an intellectual, a cultural force: law." 5
What is presently known as the European Economic Commu-
nity or European Community (EC), actually began in 1951 as the
European Coal and Steel Community.' It is somewhat ironic that
Britain7 did not join the EC until 1972 in light of the fact that one
of Britain's greatest statesmen is credited with having launched the
movement toward unity. In a speech delivered at Zurich University
in 1946, Winston Churchill stated that he had a "vision of a unified
and democratic 'greater Europe,' organized in a Council of Europe
with an assembly of elected people's representatives as the central
policy-making institution."8 Although Churchill eventually opposed
any hasty efforts to unify Europe, he has been widely recognized as
being one of the first to call for a "United States of Europe." 9
Britain's perception of the evolving European Community was
obscured by a "Channel fog" 10 between the years 1945 and 1961.
Britain first applied for EC membership in 1962, broke off negotia-
tions the following year, and debated the matter intensely for nearly
a decade before finally reapplying." After more than seventeen years
of membership, Britain continues to be the major opponent to a
strong federalist Europe. The British fear of eroding national sover-
eignty was fostered by Margaret Thatcher's well reported disputes
with the EC as well as her repeated assurances that "[w]e stay Brit-
ish."12 Despite Prime Minister John Major's more conciliatory ap-
EEC or the EC.
4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
5. W. HALLSTEIN, EUROPE IN THE MAKING 30 (1972). The current members of the
European Communities include Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
6. STEIN, supra note 3, at 2. The European Coal and Steel Community came into being
in 1951. This first successful communal institution served to place coal and steel production
under the control of a supranational authority and, thus, limit German war-making potential,
to rebuild steel production facilities, and to provide a basis for future efforts toward a unified
Europe. The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, established the European Economic Community
and the European Atomic Energy Community. In 1968 the "Merger Treaty," established a
single Council and Commission to serve the three Communities. The original six members
were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany.
7. The United Kingdom includes England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, but
is commonly referred to as Britain or Great Britain; as it will be referred to in this Comment.
See O.H. PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 19 (5th ed. 1973).
8. STEIN, supra note 3, at 1.
9. M. SHANKS & J. LAMBERT, THE COMMON MARKET TODAY AND TOMORROW 18
(1962) [hereinafter SHANKS].
10. Id. at II. The author asserts that numerous historical and cultural factors created
this "channel fog" which prevented a realistic appraisal of the potential benefits of Community
membership. See infra p. 4-8.
11. EAST, supra note 2, at xiii-xiv. Britain's membership became official on January 1,
1973.
12. Why Thatcher's Outbursts Are Tamer Than They Seem, 43 INT'L MGMT. 5 (1988).
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proach toward the European Community and his insistence that
Britain's place is "at the very heart of Europe," Major continues
Thatcher's opposition to rapid economic and political union.13
The traditional British opinion of Europe has been stated by one
observer as "a place for holidaying, not for politics."1 ' The British
have been known for more than indifference, but often "positive hos-
tility towards the idea of political, or any other sort of union among
the European states." 5 The reasons behind British foot-dragging in
becoming a member state of the EC are numerous. The European
Community initiatives that have encountered the most obstinacy
have been those initiatives that critics fear would result in an erosion
of sovereignty. Sovereignty has been defined as:
The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which
any independent state is governed; supreme political authority;
paramount control of the constitution and frame of government
and its administration; the self-sufficient source of political
power, from which all specific political powers are derived; the
international independence of a state, combined with the right
and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign dicta-
tion; also a political society, or state, which is sovereign and
independent. 6
This Comment will explore the historical and cultural forces
that have caused the delay of European integration with an emphasis
upon several sovereignty-sensitive legal impediments to integration.
In addition, the evolution of the European Monetary System will be
examined in light of Britain's recent decision to join. Beyond the
more obvious economic consequences, this decision may give some
indication of future relations between Britain and the European
Community.
II. Historical and Cultural Factors
A. Geography
To begin with the obvious, Britain is an island. Nearly four cen-
turies ago, Francis Bacon, the English essayist and philosopher, cele-
brated the isolation that the sea had imposed upon the British Isles:
"And now last, this most happy and glorious event, that this island
of Britain, divided from all the world, should be united in itself." '
Although air and sea travel have allowed convenient access to the
13. Major Signals End of Thatcher Line on the EC, The Times, Mar. 12, 1991, at 1,
col. 1.
14. EAsT, supra note 2, at 15.
15. Id. at 16.
16. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979).
17. F. BACON, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING Bk. ii. (1605).
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continent and a tunnel soon will unite England with France, many
British subjects harbor isolationist sentiment to this day. The CBS
news program, "Sixty-Minutes," investigated English reaction to the
nearly complete trans-channel tunnel. An English Reverend in-
formed reporter Steve Kroft that England was "no more in Europe
than Canada is in the United States."18 The British have long pre-
ferred to see their home as "a small island anchored off a politically
turbulent continent." 19
The easy access to the sea which the British Isles affords led
naturally to a national preoccupation with conquering the sea. Brit-
ain, "with its vast scattered Empire and innumerable Imperial Out-
posts and its unchallenged naval might, virtually policed the world
for half a century or more."2 0 Winston Churchill said that if given a
choice "between the European continent and the open sea, they must
always come down on the side of the latter: that was where their
empire and trade lay."2 While the British economy flourished upon
the spoils of colonization and their naval might remained sufficient to
protect the Kingdom, there was little incentive to pursue ties with
the continent.
B. Ancient History Meets the Modern Era
The independent spirit of the British is to be expected in light of
their great economic, military, and political successes of the past sev-
eral centuries. While maintaining a far-reaching colonial empire, the
United Kingdom (UK) was at the forefront of the industrial and
agricultural revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 2
Even after the economic chaos wrought upon Britain by both world
wars, the British were spared the wholesale devastation that oc-
curred on the continent and emerged proud and victorious. British
politicians had difficulty accepting that Britain, "in all its wartime
glory, should stoop to join forces with such down-and-outs.1 28 The
allied victory gave Britain "a sense of national achievement and co-
hesion and an illusion of power. "24
18. Sixty-Minutes: The Chunnel (CBS television broadcast, June 24, 1990) [hereinafter
The Chunnel].
19. Northedge, Britain and the EEC: Past and Present, in BRITAIN AND THE EEC 20
(Roy Jenkins, ed. 1982).
20. C.G. BAMFORD & H. ROBINSON, GEOGRAPHY OF THE EEC 12 (1983) [hereinafter
BAMFORD].
21. Northedge, supra note 19, at 20.
22. BAMFORD, supra note 20, at 11.
23. Northedge, supra note 19, at 20. Northedge asserts that because the other continen-
tal members of the EC had abdicated their sovereignty at one time or another during the
Second World War, it is easier for those nations to consent to voluntarily submit some of their
internal decision making power to a supranational body. In Britain, however, sovereignty had
been a "continuous tradition from times too distant for people to recall." Id. at 24.
24. M. CAMPS, BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1955-1963 3 (1964).
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Traditionally, the British mind-set has been one of organizing
"international coalitions against the most threatening state of the
day, the France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, the Germany of the
Kaiser and Hitler."2' 5 France's role in being a major proponent and
initiator of European unity plans has been significant in Britain's
lack of enthusiasm. Anglo-French relations have been marred by ac-
tual conflict and "psychological and cultural differences" for centu-
ries.2 6 In the words of a Kent "pub customer", many British subjects
"just do not like the French people."27 As recently as November of
1990, The Sun, Britain's largest-circulation tabloid invited, "all true
Brits to face France and yell 'up Yours Delors' " in response to EC
president Jacques Delors' federalist plans.2 8 Regardless of the possi-
ble benefits, this attitude has made less appealing to the British pub-
lic any alliance involving France. Additionally, anti-German senti-
ment was prevalent for many years following World War II and
served as a significant impediment.
Yet another consequence of the War was the deepening "special
relationship" between Britain and the United States.2 ' Britain did
not feel the need to look to Europe for friends when she was the
"close ally and associate of her great comrade-in-arms, America."30
The British felt that their most important alliance already had been
"forged in blood and sealed with victory." ' The United States did
not share these sentiments entirely, and favored early attempts at
European integration. 2 The significance of this factor waned with
the weakening of Anglo-American ties in the early 1960s. 3
Despite Britain's fiercely independent tradition, the economic
realities of the late Twentieth Century soon mandated compromise.
The economic motives that were advanced in support of Britain's
joining the European Community included the efficiency which
would result from the greater division of labor in the enlarged indus-
trial region, the broader access to markets for British companies, and
the increased necessity of keeping equal conditions with continental
competitors.3 Britain realized the need to be included in the EC
25. Northedge, supra note 19, at 20-1.
26. Id. at 22. Northedge remarks that it is not an exaggeration to say that the only issue
which allowed British and French politicians to overcome their mutual dislike was their com-
mon fear of Germany.
27. The Chunnel, supra note 18. The term "chunnel" is a combination of "channel" and
"tunnel."
28. C. Whitney, Longtime Thatcher Aide Resigns, Widening Tory Fight Over Europe,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1990, at A3, col 1.
29. BAMFORD, supra note 20, at 25.
30. SHANKS, supra note 9, at 14.
31. Id.
32. M. CAMPS, supra note 24, at 2.
33. Northedge, supra note 19, at 27.
34. GANT, The Impact of EEC Membership upon UK Industrial Performance, in BRIT-
AIN AND THE EEC 87 (R. Jenkins ed. 1982).
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rather than competing with it. British negotiators then, as now, often
find themselves in the difficult position of being directed to secure
the economic benefits that the Community offers without yielding
too much national sovereignty.
C. Sovereignty
Concern for erosion of sovereignty has been most significant and
pervasive in slowing the process of binding Britain with the Euro-
pean Community. The concern for maintaining control over internal
affairs has been both a cause of British reluctance to integrate and a
symptom of the high priority that they place upon independence.
This anxiety has been demonstrated by other members of the EC,
but seldom as adamantly as by Britain.35
In 1962 as his country underwent their first round of negotia-
tions with the European Community, Hugh Gaitskell of the British
Labour Party expressed his opinion that if Britain abandoned any
part of her sovereignty, it would mean "the end of Britain as an
independent European state. . .the end of a thousand years of his-
tory."'86 More recently, Prime Minister Thatcher issued "dire warn-
ings of the dilution of national identity, the sharing of political power
and the emergence of a Brussels "superstate." ' Since the EC is a
federation of states based upon common consent to Community law,
the fears of those opposed to integration stem primarily from the
real or imagined effects that EC laws have had upon Britain. The
actual relationship between British and European Community law
will be addressed in the following sections.
III. Community Institutions and the Nature of Community Law
The Treaty of Rome (Treaty) acts as the constitution of the
Community. The following is a brief introduction to the basic struc-
ture of the Community as provided for in the Treaty. The objectives
of the Treaty are stated as follows: to establish a common market, to
promote economic development, and to promote "closer relations be-
tween the States belonging to it." 8 The Treaty sets forth the govern-
ment bodies that are to carry out its objectives. 9
The European Parliament, or the Assembly, consists of Member
35. Northedge, supra note 19, at 22. Northedge states that "(t)he British have found it
harder than most people to accept the idea of the divisibility of sovereignty, parts of it remain-
ing at home, parts being signed away to other authorities in Brussels of elsewhere." Id. at 23.
36. Id. at 24.
37. Why Thatcher's Outbursts Are Tamer Than They Seem, supra note 12. The Euro-
pean Commission is located in Brussels, Belgium.
38. Treaty of Rome, supra note 4, art. 2.
39. Treaty of Rome, supra note 4, art 4. Articles 137-44 relate to the Assembly; arts.
145-53, the Council; arts. 154-55, the Commission; and arts. 164-188, the European Court of
Justice.
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States represented by delegates, varying in number according to
each state's population. Members are to represent the citizens of the
Community in advising and supervising the other Community bod-
ies. 40 The Commission serves as the executive branch and has the
power to initiate legislation."" The Council of Ministers (Council) is
the paramount institution, although it has no power to initiate legis-
lation,42 the Council acts upon Commission proposals and enforces
Treaty provisions through the Council's issuance of four legal acts
delineated in article 189. 48 These four acts have varying implica-
tions. Regulations have general application and are binding and di-
rectly applicable to all Member States. Directives are binding only
as to result, not to means. While decisions are binding in entirety
upon those to whom they are addressed, recommendations, and opin-
ions have no binding force.
The European Court of Justice is the sole court of the European
Community. It ensures compliance with all treaties and subsequent
acts. 4 The Court settles controversies among member states. 5 The
Court issues judgments on complaints against a member for failure
to comply with treaty obligations.4 Finally, the Court rules on the
legality of actions by Community institutions. 7
The Community laws are derived from the various EC treaties,
are voluntarily agreed to by each member, and are intended to
supercede conflicting national law. Although this point is not speci-
fied in the Treaty, it may be inferred through two articles. First,
Article 5 requires Member States to:
take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to
ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Commu-
40. Although it has been called a "phantom parliament" because of its lack of real law-
making power, the European Parliament's influence has been greater than one might expect
from its largely consultive role. See SHANKS, supra note 9, at 48-49.
41. The government of each member State appoints one Commissioner to a four-year
renewable term. The Treaty directs the Commissioners to act "in the general interest of the
Community" and specifically prohibits their national governments from trying to influence
them. For a discussion of the role of the Community's institutional framework, See SHANKS,
supra note 9, at 43-55.
42. STEIN, supra note 3, at 34. This body, which is made up of members subject to
national government control, was given principal decision-making power rather than the inde-
pendent Commission.
43. Treaty of Rome, supra note 4, at Art. 189.
44. The European Court of Justice is also referred to as "the Court of Justice" or "the
European Court". There are currently thirteen justices, one for each Member State. STEIN,
supra note 3, at 33.
45. STEIN, supra note 3, at 134.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Court also provides two more functions which are less applicable to this
discussion. The Court may issue preliminary rulings on the request of a court of a member
state regarding treaty interpretations. In addition; if the Court chooses, it may issue opinions,
proposals, or advice on matters which the Court deems relevant.
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nity. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's
tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which could jeop-
ardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.'8
Second, the conflict of laws issue has come before the European
Court by reference to Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome." The key
language is in paragraph three, which grants the European Court
jurisdiction where "there is no judicial remedy under national
law."50
The Court of Justice first dealt squarely with the conflict of
laws issue in N.V. Algemene Transport-En Expeditie Onderneming
Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Reveue.5' The Court re-
ferred to the creation of a "new legal order of international law for
the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights"
and concluded that: "[i]ndependently of the legislation of member
states, Community law. . not only imposes obligations on individ-
uals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become
part of their legal heritage." 2 Thus, the Court stated explicitly that
some treaty provisions are enforceable by or against an individual
and implied that Community law prevails over national law."3 Costa
v. Ente nazionale Energia elettrica impresa gia della Edison Volta
presented the Court with a similar conflict." In this landmark case,
the issue was whether the Italian government could nationalize an
electric utility in contravention of Community Law. The Court used
language similar to that used in Van Gend en Loos in stating:
The integration into the laws of each member state of pro-
visions which derive from the Community, and more generally
the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, make it impossible for the
48. Treaty of Rome, supra note 4, at art. 5.
49. Treaty of Rome, supra note 4, at art. 177. This article grants the Court jurisdiction
to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of
acts of the institutions of the Community; (c) the interpretation of the statutes
of bodies established by an act of the Council. Where any such question is raised
in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State, against whose
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal
shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
Id.
50. Treaty of Rome, supra note 4, at art. 177.
51. N.V. Algemente Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nether-
lands Fiscal Administration, 1963 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 1, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8008
(1963) [hereinafter Van Gend en Loos]. The Court was asked to decide whether nationals of
Member States could assert rights raised by Community law in attempting to overcome na-
tional law.
52. Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 1 at 12, Common Mkt. L.R. 105, at
129 (1963).
53. Bebr, Law of the European Communities and Municipal Law, 34 MODERN L. REV.
481, 488-89 (1971).
54. Costa v. Ente nazionale Energia elettrica impresa gia della Edison Volta, 1964 E.
COMM. CT. J. REP. 585, COMMON MKT. L.R. 425 (1964) [hereinafter Costa v. ENEL].
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states, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and
subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a
basis of reciprocity . . . .The precedence of Community law is
confirmed by Article 189, whereby a regulation 'shall be bind-
ing' and 'directly applicable in all member states'. . . . The
transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the
Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising
under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their
sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act in-
compatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail
(emphasis added). 5.
This decision stressed the restriction of sovereign rights and the
creation of a new body of law applicable to individuals, not just
member states." Treaty provisions enforceable by individuals are
said to have "direct effect," not to be confused with the "directly
applicable" provision of article 189 of the Treaty of Rome.5 7 Article
189 specifies that Community regulations are "directly applicable"
and, therefore, are binding upon all member states.58 It would be
inconsistent with the above assertions to allow member states to cre-
ate legislation contrary to Treaty obligations to which they had vol-
untarily bound themselves.
There have been several other celebrated cases handed down by
the Court of Justice on the subject of primacy of Community law. 59
For the purposes of this Comment, it is sufficient to recognize that
Community law prevails in all direct- confrontations with national
law.60
IV. British Constitutional Law and Parliamentary Supremacy
The British government is highly centralized. The government's
power over legislation is not granted by modern era law, but rather
55. Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 585 at 593-4, Common Mkt. L.R. at
455-6 (1964).
56. L. COLLINS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 13 (1984).
57. Easson, The "Direct Effect" of EEC Directives, 28 INr'L & COMP. L.Q. 319 (1979).
58. Id.
59. See Eunomia di Porto v. Ministry of Education, 1971 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 811,
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 4 (1972) (holding that Italy had to repay taxes collected in con-
tradiction of Art. 16); Leonesio v. Italian Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry, 1972 E. COMM.
CT. J. REP. 287, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 287 (1973) (upholding regulations directly con-
ferring rights upon individuals which national courts must safeguard); Internationale Handel-
sgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide, 1970 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 1125,
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 255 (1972) (supremacy of Community law asserted over constitu-
tional law of Member States); and Simmenthal v. Italian Minister of Finance, 1976 E. COMM.
CT. J. REP. 1871, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 (1977) (holding that directly applicable regu-
lations take precedence over both prior and subsequent national legislation and thus, courts
must set aside national law which conflicts and uphold individuals rights).
60. W. HALLSTEIN, supra note 5, at 34-5. Although it is true that deference paid to
Community law is by consent of the members, continued membership is contingent upon obey-
ing that law and thus, it may be said that Community law is supreme.
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is inherited from the absolute monarchs of the past."1 The United
Kingdom has no comprehensive' written constitution.62 In British
constitutional practice, power lies with the monarchy who is advised
by ministers and is responsible to Parliament.6" The government can
"virtually do what it likes" with very few constitutional limitations
and without beholding to a supreme court. 64 There is no judicial re-
view of Parliamentary decisions beyond mere interpretation.
65
Given the freedom which Parliament maintained for centuries,
some members are disquieted by the usurpation of Parliamentary
sovereignty. Even after Britain's accession to the Community, the
effect of Community law was in question. To give effect to the
Treaty of Rome within the United Kingdom, an act of Parliament
was required. Lord Denning of the British Court of Appeal stated
the situation as follows:
Even though the Treaty of Rome has been signed, it has no
effect, so far as these Courts are concerned, until it is made an
Act of Parliament. Once it is implemented by an Act of Parlia-
ment, these Courts must go by the Act of Parliament. Until that
day comes, we take no notice of it."
With the European Communities Act of 1972, Parliament pro-
vided for the incorporation of Community law into the law of the
United Kingdom. 67 In doing so, Parliament did not take any revolu-
tionary steps or renounce its legal sovereignty. 68 In fact, the Act is
expressive on the subject of the Parliamentary sovereignty and al-
lows Parliament to amend or repeal the Act at any time. 69 The key
provisions of the Act read as follows:
(1)those rights and duties which are, as a matter of Community
law, directly applicable or effective are to be given legal effect in
the United Kingdom (s 2(1));
(2)the executive is given power to make orders and regulations
to give effect both to obligations of the United Kingdom and to
deal with any incidental problems arising from those rights and
duties which are directly applicable or effective (s 2(2));
(3)there are limitations on the power of delegated legislation
61. Northedge, supra note 19, at 23.
62. LANE, Legal Implications of British Entry into the Common Market, 37 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROBS. 359 (1972).
63. Northedge, supra note 19, at 23.
64. Id.
65. LANE, supra note 62, at 359. Acts of Parliament may be interpreted, but not over-
turned by British courts.
66. McWhirter v. A-G, 2 ALL E.R. 1380 at 1382 (1971), 1 W.L.R. 1037 at 1039 (1971),
784 COMM. MKT. L.R. at 789, (1971).
67. Id.
68. L. COLLINS, supra note 56 at 21-3.
69. Id., at 23.
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conferred by the Act, most notably that the power does not in-
clude powers (a) to tax, (b) to legislate retrospectively, or (c) to
subdelegate (s 2(2) and Sch 2). . .and the orders and regula-
tions may include any provision as might be made by Act of
Parliament, and any existing or future enactments may be al-
tered by Parliament (s 2(4));
(4)any question as to the meaning or effect of the treaties is to
be treated as a question of law to be determined in accordance
with Community law, or which judicial notice is to be taken (s
3(1) and (2));
(5)specific alterations are made to existing law (statute and
common law) to take account of specific Community obligations,
especially in the area of customs, duties, agriculture, company
law and restrictive practices (ss 4-10).70
Presently, British constitutional law is "the orthodox one,"
therefore, courts will give effect to subsequently enacted United
Kingdom law even if inconsistent with Community law.7' Article 189
states that only regulations are directly applicable to Member states.
Community law that is not directly applicable will not have force in
Britain until that Community law is enacted by Parliament.7 2 Di-
rectly applicable legislation will be given effect, notwithstanding any
prior conflicting legislation.73 Shortly after Britain joined the Com-
munity, author Gerhard Bebr described the process conformed to by
British courts: "the critical examination of the national case
law. . .reflects a gradual, sometimes slow, but nevertheless definite
impact of the [Community] Court's case law. The reluctance and
resistance of municipal courts are gradually making room to an ac-
ceptance of the progressive case law of the court. '7' This process
continues today.
V. Legal Issues and Regulatory Areas Affecting Sovereignty
After British law was adjusted to accommodate the Community
system, British Courts were left with the tasks of interpreting and
applying Community law. Contention and complication has arisen in
numerous areas, including: anti-trust law, trademark and patent law,
company law, trade regulation, taxation, political union, and envi-
ronmental law. The remainder of this Comment will examine the
application of treaties and secondary legislation to three fields tradi-
tionally deemed to be within the sovereign's exclusive control: agri-
70. Id. at 22.
71. Id. at 30.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. G. Bebr, How Supreme is Community Law in the National Courts, 11 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 3, 8 (1974).
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culture, immigration, and monetary policy. These areas have caused
considerable strife between Britain and the Community since the
early negotiations, and they remain obstacles to integration.
A. Common Agricultural Policy
Matters of agricultural trade among members of the Commu-
nity are regulated by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Be-
cause of the importance of agricultural matters in the economies and
lifestyles of Western Europe, the drafting of the CAP has been char-
acterized as the most significant and difficult achievement of the
Community during the 1960s."5 Others have regarded the CAP more
cynically. John Marsh, a British professor of agricultural economics,
has called the CAP "a symbol of the divisiveness, inefficiency and
collective stupidity of the Community. ' '76 In addition, Marsh has
stated that: "(Oar from being an integrating device, it promises to
prove the explosive which finally wrecks all hope of European
unity."
77
Since it was such a "thorny problem,17 8 the Treaty negotiators
did not lay out an intricately detailed agricultural policy. Rather,
Community founders merely stated that there should be a policy to
increase productivity and to maintain both supply and a fair stan-
dard of living for farmers.7 ' The CAP as first delineated in 1962 and
as it exists today, has attempted to achieve the above goals by peg-
ging prices, removing barriers to trade, and allocating various types
of crop subsidies.80 The CAP has not been defined in any Commu-
75. FOSLING, The Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, in BRITAIN IN THE EEC
86 (D. Evans ed. 1972).
76. MARSH, The Common Agricultural Policy, in BRITAIN AND THE EEC 38 (R. Jen-
kins ed. 1982).
77. Id.
78. SHANKS, supra note 9, at 87.
79. Id. The Treaty of Rome at art. 38, par. 1, states that "the common market shall
extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural products." Paragraph 4 of the same article calls
for the establishment of "a common agricultural policy among the Member States." Article 39
lays out the objectives of the CAP as follows:
(a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress
and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the op-
timum utilization of the factors of production, in particular labour; (b) thus to
ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by
increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; (c) to
stabilise markets; (d) to assure the availability of supplies; (e) to ensure that
supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 4, at art. 39.
80. B. HILL, THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 22-23
(1984). The mechanics of the CAP are quite detailed and beyond the scope of this Comment.
Different methods of price and supply control are employed individually. Some products are
regulated merely with price controls such as variable levies which effectively price imports out
of the market. Other products are favored with export restitutions which bridge the gap be-
tween the higher Community prices and those of the world market. Supply and demand forces
may mandate that surpluses be purchased by the Community in order to protect the livelihood
of farmers. Id.
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nity treaties, but rather has evolved gradually through policies of the
Council and Commission.
Britain's first application for membership in the European Com-
munity was being evaluated simultaneously with the Community's
implementation of the CAP in the early 1960s. British negotiators
named agriculture as one of the three major problem areas con-
fronting them. 1 In particular, the negotiations addressed the stabil-
ity of consumer prices in Britain, living standards for British farm-
ers, and the removal of British tariffs. 82 The first ascension
negotiations failed out of contention over these and other concerns.
Agricultural matters again became significant in Britain's second
application.
In a debate before the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary
George Brown named agriculture as the first in a series of "broad
areas of policy which seemed likely to cause the most difficulty" be-
tween Britain and the European Community. 3 Other matters that
caused concern during the second application process included the
likely affect upon food prices, the ability of British farmers to com-
pete, and assessing the cost of the CAP.8' The price and competition
issues caused minimal discord, but the CAP's affect upon the EC
budget presented an issue that is still debated today. Since financing
the CAP requires approximately three-quarters of the Community
budget, CAP expenditures figure prominently in budget debates. 85 In
the 1987-88 fiscal year, eighty percent of Britain's EC contributions
went toward farm support8 6
Almost from her inception as a Community Member, Britain
pressed for a renegotiation of her budget contribution assessment.
87
The 1975 Dublin Summit resulted in a modification of the British
budgetary contribution, much to the irritation of the remainder of
the EC who felt it a bit "perfidious" of the UK to demand changes
so shortly after joining.8 8 However, Britain was still unhappy with
the amount of its contribution. 8'
It is not surprising that Britain has protested the significant al-
location of British revenues to a system in which only Germany and
the UK were net contributors in the 1980s and all other members
81. WHITE PAPER, 1965, CMND. 1565, reprinted in Nicholson & East, From the Six to
the Twelve: the enlargement of the European Communities, 14-2 1, at 15 (1987).
82. Id. at 18-20.
83. EAST, supra note 2, at 44.
84. H. THOMAS, EUROPE: THE RADICAL CHALLENGE 169-70 (1973).
85. B. HILL, supra note 80, at 84.
86. Mrs. Thatcher Eati Her Words, But Nobody Eats the Surpluses, THE ECONOMIST,
June 22, 1985, at 53.
87. B. HILL, supra note.80, at 46.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 47.
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benefited.9" The enormous cost and relatively small achievement of
the CAP has caused "an annual battle between the UK and the
other members over a budget refund." '91 In 1982 EC farm ministers
overrode British objections to a farm price settlement that continued
the unfavorable situation. 2 This vote was reported to "(f)uel . ..
the far from dormant embers of anti-common-market sentiment in
Britain" and cause Prime Minister Thatcher to "boil . . .over with
rage."93 In 1984 the British again fought for protection from pay-
ment levels that they believed unfair.94 In 1987 the budget battles
and a strained Community financial picture provided impetus for a
major CAP cost reduction effort that had little long-term benefits.
95
Despite regular promises of reform, the CAP remains a stagger-
ingly expensive and controversial program. In 1990 the EC's total
subsidy to farmers was eighty-one billion dollars.96 Subsidies make
up an average of 48 % of individual farm incomes in the Commu-
nity.97 In July 1991 the Community held unsold stockpiles of "20
million tons of cereals, 750,000 tons of beef, and 900,000 tons of
milk and butter."9 8
Such enormous expenditures were a primary cause of the break-
down of last year's talks on the Uruguay Round of General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).9 9 According to The Economist,
the protectionist CAP acts as a barrier to a new world trade agree-
ment, an impediment to aiding Eastern Europe by excluding their
agricultural products, and costs the average British family of four
730 pounds per year in higher prices.1 "
The latest CAP reformation plan was unveiled in July by agri-
culture commissioner Ray MacSharry. 1° 1 The most significant new
proposal would cut prices guaranteed to farmers through subsidies,
but make up the difference through direct cash grants to farmers.10
This move would shift only the cost of rigged food prices to the EC
budget.' 03
90. Id. at 137.
91. Id. at 158.
92. The Day Britain's Bluff Was Called, THE ECONOMIST, May 22, 1982, at 77.
93. Id.
94. After the Milk Mountain, Can the Summit Be Reached?, THE ECONOMIST, March
17, 1984, at 44.
95. Stabilising the EECs Wobbly Bike, THE ECONOMIST, December 12, 1987, at 77.
96. Agricultural Subsidies; Sowing in Tears, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 1991, at 56.
[hereinafter Agricultural Subsidies].
97. Id.
98. EC Ministers Clash Over Farming Cuts, The Times, Jul. 16, 1991, at 11, col. 3.
99. Id.
100. Of Corn and Cash, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 1991, at 50. [hereinafter Of Corn
and Cash].
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As of late September 1991 debate continues over the latest
CAP reform effort. British negotiators claim to have "fundamental
differences" with recent proposals and fear the creation of a "perma-
nent system of social security for unviable farmers."1 4 David Curry,
the junior agriculture minister, said that Britain wants a "significant
price cut" and a compensation system that must be "limited in time
and gradually declining." 10 5
Despite the apparent need for change, the Torry Party receives
a great deal of support from farmers and is not likely to fully em-
brace free trade principles.10 6 Of course, any victory for Community
farmers is a defeat for Community consumers. The wide range of
internal and international divergent interests that seek to influence
CAP decisions undoubtedly will be an area of continued dispute.
B. Immigration
The power to control which persons may enter a country and
what business they may conduct is both a major component of inte-
gration and an important element of national security and sover-
eignty. Community Commission President Jacques Delors has re-
ferred to the removal of restrictions upon free movement of EC
citizens across national borders as "the most visible and tangible
proof of the reality of a unified Community."107
The Treaty of Rome affected Britain's immigration law and
continues to be an issue of contention. The British have been con-
cerned primarily with effects that liberalized immigration will have
upon the employment market and national security. Article 48(1) of
the Treaty provides for free movement of workers within the Com-
munity.10 8 Paragraph 2 explains that this necessitates the abolition
of any employment discrimination based upon nationality. In sharp
contrast, Britain's 1971 Immigration Act allows the government to
exclude or deport any non-citizen whenever such an action is
"deemed conducive to the public good."109 However, since joining
the EC, Britain has allowed nationals of other Community Member
States to enter and reside in the country subject only to concerns for
public health, public security, and public policy. 10 European Com-
munity Council Directive 64/221 (Directive) provides certain proce-
104. Britain Opposes EC Plan for Permanent Grants to Farmers, The Times, Sept. 24,
1991, at 11, col. 1.
105. Id.
106. Of Corn and Cash, supra note 100, at 50.
107. Nelson, Sticking Points, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1990 at R37, ol. 1.
108. Treaty of Rome, supra note 4, at art. 48(1).
109. Evans, United Kingdom Courts and European Community Law Governing the Ex-
clusion or Expulsion of Migrants, PUBLIC L. Winter 1981, 497.
110. Id. at 497-98.
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dural safeguards for Community migrants.111 That Directive guaran-
tees due process to persons challenging immigration decisions and
specifically forbids rejection on economic grounds or on the sole basis
of a criminal record.
112
The European Court of Justice first interpreted the aforemen-
tioned Directive in Van Duyn v. Home Office.113 Van Duyn, a Dutch
scientologist, challenged her exclusion from the UK because she, as
a scientologist, was a member of a disfavored group. The Court em-
phasized that public policy decisions had to be made in the context
of Community and not national law. However, the Court did allow
some discretion on the part of the member states and found that Van
Duyn's membership in a group considered to be against public policy
was a valid reason to exclude her.
114
Subsequent decisions by the European Court of Justice have
limited the scope of what constitutes valid public policy. In R. v.
Bouchereau, a Frenchman convicted of drug possession, invoked
Community law to oppose a British court's decision to deport him.
11 5
A British Magistrates Court asked the European Court of Justice
what weight a criminal conviction should be given when contemplat-
ing deportation. The Court responded that a previous criminal con-
viction could be taken into account as evidence of a present threat.
Regarding interpretation of the term "public policy" used in article
48(3) of the Treaty of Rome, the Court stated that this concept re-
quires "the existence, in addition to the perturbation of the social
order which any infringement of the law involves, of a genuine and
sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of public policy affect-
ing one of the fundamental interests of society." ' Faced with this
narrow interpretation, the magistrate fined Mr. Bouchereau rather
than deporting him.117
The extent of the Community's influence on immigration law
was further illustrated in R. v. The Secretary of State for Home
Affairs, ex parte Santillo."a Mr. Santillo, an Italian national, was
charged with burglary and rape. At his sentencing, his deportation
was recommended. This recommendation was acted upon when Mr.
Santillo was released from prison. The Court of Justice was asked to
Ill. JO. COMM. EUR. (No. L 850) (1964).
112. EVANS, supra note 109, at 498.
113. Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 1337, 1975 COMM. MKT.
L.R. 1.
114. Id., 1974 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 1337, at 1351.
115. R. v. Bouchereau, 1977 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 1999.
116. Id. at 2014.
117. S. Paisley, European Community Law Flows Across the Channel Into United
Kingdom Immigration Law, 33 N. IR. L. Q. 85, 88 (1982).
118. R. v. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte Santillo, 1980 E. COMM.
CT. J. REP. 1585 [hereinafter Santillo].
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rule upon Mr. Santillo's contention that the individual rights con-
ferred upon him by Article 9(1) of Directive 64/221 had been
breached. This article deals with the right of appeal and the proper
authority for ordering expulsion. The Court indicated that the deci-
sion made on review ordering Mr. Santillo's expulsion must be "suf-
ficiently proximate in time" to the original recommendation and that
"a lapse of time amounting to several years between the recommen-
dation for deportation and the decision by the administration is lia-
ble to deprive the recommendation of its function as an opinion
within the meaning of Article 9."119 The British Divisional Court
allowed deportation upon finding that the four and a half years
served by Mr. Santillo was sufficiently proximate in time to conclude
that the status of the risk had not changed.
120
Since the Treaty is concerned predominantly with the economic
consequences of immigration, Article 48 applies to the free move-
ment of "workers." 1 21 In administrating her own immigration law,
Britain had to determine who qualified as a worker. In 1974 in R. v.
Secchi, a British magistrate held that an Italian student who trav-
eled and worked intermittently across Europe did not qualify as a
worker and could be deported for indecent exposure and
shoplifting.
1 22
In 1981 the Court formally addressed the question of who quali-
fies as a worker. The Court reiterated a prior holding that "worker"
was a Community concept that could not be defined by national
law.123 The Court further stated that one need have only a job to
qualify as a worker.1 24 There has been no criteria as to hours worked
or salary, but the work has to be more than a "marginal."'1 25
There has been considerable debate regarding whether tourists
may qualify as workers. The European Court has stated that the
individual's motive is to be considered. 126 The national's prime moti-
vation for emigrating must be to provide services as a worker or to
receive the services of another, such as medical treatment. 2 In this
context, it is doubtful that one who is merely passing through would
qualify as a worker.
The above deportation remedies are reasonably effective when
there has already been a conviction. Deportation proceedings do
119. Id. at 1600.
120. Santillo, supra note 118, at 1593.
121. Treaty of Rome, supra note 4, at art. 48.
122. R. v. Sechi, 15 COMM. MKT. L.R. 383 (1975).
123. Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1982 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 1035, 34 COMM.
MKT. L.R. 454.
124. Id. at 1038, 34 COMM. MKT. L.R. at 467.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1053, 34 COMM. MKT. L.R. at 470.
127. Id.
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nothing to regulate the flow of Community nationals who are al-
lowed to move about freely. This has led to concerns in Britain over
the number of immigrants that may be attracted as well as the ease
with which drug smugglers, terrorists, or other criminals may enter
and move about the community. 128 This fear has developed into one
of the formidable obstacles toward the economic integration that is
to be completed in 1992.
C. Monetary Policy
The progression toward complete European integration has been
described as a three stage rocket: customs union, economic union,
and political union."2 9 While much attention has been directed to-
ward the mandated 1992 completion of the customs union, the mon-
etary union is making significant progress.
The Treaty of Rome makes no mention of economic policy coor-
dination except to state that cooperation should be sufficient to en-
sure the maintenance of each member's balance of payments to the
Community.3 0 The concept naturally evolved following the efforts
toward political integration and free trade.' Like the establishment
of political and trade agreements, the effort to centralize monetary
policy has been marred by political battles. Many of the arguments
regarding Britain's participation in a monetary union parallel earlier
discussions regarding Britain's participation in the European Eco-
nomic Community.' Opponents echo familiar cries that such a
move would intolerably erode national sovereignty. The debate gen-
erally focuses upon the extent to which national monetary systems
should be integrated. The staunchest advocates of British national-
ism fear that a true monetary union could give the Community
enough control over national monetary policy effectively to yield
London's spending power to the European Commission in Brussels.
The general concept of a monetary union was tossed about since
the Community's inception in 1958.13 The necessity for a European
monetary union became more urgent after Richard Nixon discontin-
ued the gold standard in 1971.13" That action ended the Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates which linked other currencies
128. Nelson, supra note 107, at R37, col. 3-4.
129. Hallstein, supra note 5, at 102.
130. Treaty of Rome, supra note 4, at art. 104.
131. G.E. WOOD, The European Monetary System - Past Developments, Future Pros-
pects and Economic Rationale, in BRITAIN AND THE EEC 131 (1982).
132. Id. at 132.
133. P. LUDLOW, THE MAKING OF THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM 2 (1982).
134. A Brief History of Funny Money, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1990, at 21. Because
world currencies were no longer linked to the value of a real commodity, the value of money
was left to the discretion of the issuing governments.
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to the dollar.'3 5
The first practical efforts to coordinate Community monetary
policy began in 1969 at a meeting of Community heads of state at
the Hague." 6 Several different approaches were taken during the
1970s with only limited success.' In 1970 the Werner Committee
stated the goals of Community monetary union to be: "the total and
irreversible convertability of currencies, the elimination of margins
of fluctuation in rates of exchange and the irrevocable fixing of par-
ity ratios'."' 8 It was presumed that the "irreversibility" that was
called for could be accomplished only by amalgamating the Commu-
nity currencies into a single currency managed by a single bank. 13 9
The plans which emerged during the 1970s were often criticized and
not very effective.
The presently existing European Monetary System (EMS) is
the result of a reform of the previous system of exchange rate con-
trol. In a parallel to how Winston Churchill provided the stimulus
for the Community itself; it was Roy Jenkins, the English Commis-
sion President, whose call for re-examination of the old system
launched the current EMS which his country would long oppose.'"
In assessing the poor economic period of the late seventies, Mr. Jen-
kins felt that the member states "had gone too much their own way"
and that a new system could be instituted to "provide the central
theme of our economic policies in the period ahead.""' The British
press gave Mr. Jenkins' plan little hope of political success and
found it ironic that one of their own was playing the role of federal-
ist."' As the reformulation gained momentum, German Chancellor
Schmidt and French President M. Giscard d'Estaing became the
major patrons of the EMS.
The current version of the EMS is a compromise between fixed
and floating exchange rates.'" Exchange-rates are pegged through a
"parity grid" system that uses a measure called an European Cur-
rency Unit (ECU)."' A mutually agreed upon schedule of exchange
rates among all the member currencies is used to measure a particu-
135. P. LUDLOW, supra note 133, at 2.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 2-12.
138. P. OPPENHEIMER, The Problem of Monetary Union, in BRITAIN IN THE EEC 99
(1973). The Werner Committee was charged by the Commission to give substance to the
broad principles agreed upon at the Hague summit.
139. Id.
140. P. LUDLOW, supra note 133, at 37.
141. Id. at 39.
142. Id. at 55. A "federalist" is one who favors a strong central government.
143. Flexing the EMS, THE ECONOMIST, December 2, 1989, at 14. [hereinafter Flexing
the EMS].
144. G.E. WOOD, supra note 131, at 132. An ECU is derived from a weighted average
of all the member courtries' currencies.
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lar currency's divergence from this specified rate.1"" Any divergence
is measured in ECU's."' When a currency varies a certain amount,
the country which issued that currency is expected to buy or sell
their own currency in order to adjust the rate accordingly. " 7
The EMS provides for a system of credit facilities which will
loan funds to Member States in order to allow them to engage in
exchange rate intervention. " ' The EMS also maintains the Euro-
pean Monetary Fund (EMF). This fund receives currency deposits
from members and issues ECU's in return for the purpose of settling
intra-community debt.
Britain's political climate of the late 1970s provided for a rather
hasty dismissal of the EMS. In addition to the overriding advance-
ment of unity disapproval, there were many more specific criticisms
of entry. Initial resistance was mainly political. 1 '9 Prime Minister
Callaghan and his Labour Party did not want to embark upon con-
sideration of the EMS right before an election. Critics disliked the
fact that the system was based upon the Deutschmark instead of the
pound.150 Some were distrustful because the two primary architects
of the plan were a Frenchman and a German, and that they had
sprung the plan upon the Community with little outside input. 1
There was even a theory that the whole proposal was part of a
"Machiavellian German plot to boost their exports and ruin the
United Kingdom's."1 52
There were also numerous economic arguments against joining.
A Treasury report found that because membership would deprive the
British government of the ability depreciate the pound, the exchange
rate would be kept artificially high.' 53 While the Treasury accepted
the goal of greater monetary stability, there was disapproval over the
vague terms and lack of detail with which the initial plan was laid
out." The effects of this were to be a drop in gross national product
and consequently higher unemployment.155 Because "compromise of-
fends the purist," some economists disliked the system's compromise
between fixing exchange rates and letting them float.1 6 The EMS
was not without supporters in Britain. In fact, several highly es-




148. Id. at 133.
149. P. LUDLOW, supra note 133, at 108.
150. Id. at 110.
151. Id. at 112.
152. Id. at Ill.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 112-3.
155. Id.
156. Flexing the EMS, supra note 143.
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try.1 57 Despite this support, the British government initially refused
to join. Since then, however, times and circumstances have changed.
Members of the EMS include France, Germany, Italy, Den-
mark, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, and,
as of October 8, 1990; Britain." Greece and Portugal are the only
two Community members who are not in the EMS, and that is be-
cause their inflation rates are currently too high.159 There has been
speculation that Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria, and Switzerland
may be considered for future EMS membership.160 With the decision
to join the Community and not to join the EMS initially, Britain's
recent entrance was based upon economic as well as political
reasons.
Contrary to many initial expectations, over a decade later the
system has succeeded in stabilizing member currencies and holding
inflation at low German levels. e1 That triumph over inflation has
made it more difficult for non-members to achieve "anti-inflationary
credibility."' 162 Mrs. Thatcher was forced into assenting to the EMS
earlier than planned by weak economic conditions in Britain and an
eight year high inflation rate of 10.9%."6 As contrasted with the
success of the system, Britain's poor economic conditions created a
situation in which Mrs. Thatcher "took advantage of an excellent
opportunity of monetary conditions coming within their limits." 1e4
EMS membership has quickly benefited Britain. The inflation rate
for August 1991 was a low 4.7%.165
The decision was hailed by many as a "clear sign of Britain's
growing commitment to European integration, both monetary and
political." 66 However, that may have been a premature appraisal.
To the contrary, it has been suggested that Mrs. Thatcher intended
to use membership and direct participation to slow the pace of inte-
gration. 1 7 In actuality, all that Britain really has committed to is a
system of controlling exchange rates. That in itself is not alarming,
except to the most avid anti-federalists. Membership in the EMS is,
however, a necessary step toward complete monetary union, a com-
157. P. LUDLOW, supra note 133, at 222.
158. S. Prokesch, Britain Will Join European System of Currency Rates, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 6, 1990, at 1, col. 5.
159. Who's Next in the ERM Queue?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 1990, at 85. [hereinaf-
ter Who's Next].
160. Id. Austria and Norway have submitted applications to join the Community.
161. Flexing the EMS, supra note 143.
162. Who's Next, supra note 159.
163. Thatcher Shrugs Off Eight-Year Inflation High, The Times, Oct. 13, 1990, at 1,
col. 2.
164. Resignation Fuels ERM Unrest, The Times, Oct. 17, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
165. The Times, Sept. 14, 1991, at 1, col. 1.
166. EC Hails a Wider Commitment to Europe, The Times, Oct. 6, 1990, at 2, col. 3.
167. Britain Will Join European System of Currency Rates, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1990,
at 35, col. 5.
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mon currency, and perhaps even the "United States of Europe" long
ago envisioned by Churchill.
Commission President Jacques Delors is the major proponent
and engineer behind complete monetary union. He has developed a
three stage plan. 68 Stage one involves the free movement of capital
and some coordination of monetary policies, began in July 1990.169
Stage two calls for the creation of a European central bank reminis-
cent of the American federal reserve. 170 This "Eurofed" would con-
trol exchange rates and further coordinate monetary policies.'7 The
final stage allows the "Eurofed" to run completely each member na-
tion's monetary policies and permanently fix exchange rates. 72 The
Commission wants to start stage two in January 1993 and follow
"soon after" with stage three. 173
The scene is set for another trans-channel showdown. Although
John Major has improved Britain's relations with the Community
since succeeding Mrs. Thatcher in November 1990, he shares her
opposition to a single currency. 17' Britain is the only EC country to
reject the goal of common currency.
175
Progress toward monetary union increasingly seems inevitable.
For a short period of time, it appeared that Germany would support
Britain's "go slow" rhetoric. 1 6  However, German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl recently joined with France, Italy, and Belgium in call-
ing for the speedy creation of a monetary union. 177 In May 1991
Jacques Delors said that "[i]f at the end of 1991 the British still do
not want a single currency, we will find a formula.' 78
Pressure at home is also rising. Mrs. Thatcher's fierce opposi-
tion to European federalism has caused a split within her own Con-
servative Party which continues to this day. 17 9 The decision to join
the EMS was seen by many as an effort to bolster the Conservative's
standing as they lose position in the polls to the Labour Party.180 In
1989 elections, Labour used growing dissatisfaction with the Prime
Minister's anti-EC stance to hand the Conservatives their first major






174. Britain Balks at EC Currency Deal, The Times, May 12, 1991, at 12, col. 1. [here-
inafter Britain Balks].
175. Id.
176. S. Prokesch, Kohl Plan Breathes Life Into Monetary Union, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22,
1990 at A13, col. 1 [hereinafter Kohl].
177. Id.
178. Britain balks, supra note 174.
179. C. Whitney, supra note 28.
180. S. Prokesch, supra note 158
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defeat since 1979.181 Should Labour gain power, the pace of integra-
tion would undoubtedly quicken. The Labour Party recently com-
pleted a resolution endorsing further movement toward economic
and monetary union and criticizing the Conservatives for lagging be-
hind events.182 The resolution stated: "The direction is set. National
policy towards the EC. . .must firmly relate to that reality."183 The
history of begrudging British submission and the future of economic
interdependence make it seem inevitable that Britain will eventually
fall in line with whatever form the monetary union may eventually
take.
VI. Conclusion and Update
Britain sat out the first twenty years of European federation
building. Despite well-founded arguments that the British form of
government could not be compromised or adapted to yield sover-
eignty to a continental body, Britain joined the European Commu-
nity. Following ascension, many viewed the imposing task of modify-
ing the British legal system to accommodate Community law to be a
crippling impediment to integration. However, compromise has
yielded workable solutions in the areas of anti-trust law, trademark
and patent law, company law, trade regulation, taxation policy, envi-
ronmental law, and immigration law. Britain went as far as threat-
ening to withhold budget contributions or even leave the community
when outrage flared over CAP contributions. Again, a compromise
was reached. After joining the EMS, Mrs. Thatcher was widely
quoted as telling the House of Commons: "In my view, we have sur-
rendered enough."184
It seems certain that Britain, under the direction of John Major
or the Labour Party, shall surrender even more. Not only do eco-
nomic circumstances demand this outcome, but it seems that politi-
cal opinion in Britain is becoming more supportive of increased Eu-
ropean involvement. 8
Mr. Major and his Conservative government have continued
Mrs. Thatcher's opposition to political and defense union. Following
the Community's weak response to recent events in the Persian Gulf,
Mr. Delors has called for a policy of common defense.186 Britain, as
the Gulf war showed, is more likely to look to the United States for
181. J. Ryser, More Than Ever, Thatcher is Odd Woman Out, BUSINESS WEEK, Jul. 3,
1989, at 40.
182. Kinnock Demands Greater Efforts on EC Convergence, The Times, Jul. 9, 1991, at
7, col. 1.
183. Id.
184. C. Whitney, supra note 28.
185. Thatcher v. Europe, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 1990 at 15-16.
186. Arming the EC, The Times, Mar. 8, 1991, at 15, col. 1.
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defense.18 7 Regardless of Britain's long-standing objection to political
union, the UK's participation in EC-sponsored efforts to aid Eastern
Europe and to broker a settlement to the conflict in Yugoslavia re-
veal how events have outpaced principles.
One observer commented upon former Prime Minister
Thatcher's style of Euro-diplomacy: "Mrs. Thatcher shouts and
waves her famous handbag at scheming Europeans, but in the end
she always grits her teeth and signs."' 8 Although he has improved
British-EC relations, Mr. Major recently told the House of Com-
mons that a "European 'superstate'" would be unacceptable to him
and to Britain." 9 Douglas Herd, the foreign secretary, has balked at
the use of the word "federal" in a newly proposed treaty' 90 and
warned EC negotiators that talks would collapse if they pushed the
pace of inter-governmental integration.' 9' In a move partially moti-
vated by a desire to slow the federalism process, Mr. Major has fash-
ioned himself as a "widener," who favors opening the Community to
Eastern Europe and other nations." 2 French President Mitterrand
leads the "deepeners," who seek closer integration inside Western
Europe. 1 3 Mr. Major, like Mrs. Thatcher, will inevitably be forced
into further European integration.
The acceleration of integration and the growing interdepen-
dence between national economies make it clear that Britain will be
swept up in any and all future federalizing measures, including mon-
etary and political union. Sovereignty shall be compromised further.
Such a sacrifice is essential in order to ensure that Britain remains
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